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Abstract 
Ethiopia introduced multi-party system following the 1991 regime 
change. Consequently, dozens of political parties have been established. 
However, little has been done with regard to the degree of programmaticity 
of Ethiopian Political Parties (EPPs); the nature and the type of the party 
system they are operating. Hence, this research was intended to analyse the 
level of prorammaticity and typology of EPPs, and the nature and type of the 
party system that are operating. The study was designed to answer whether 
EPPs and the party system they are operating are programmatic. Both 
descriptive and analytical methods were employed and data were analyzed 
through qualitative approach. The study found that although with a varying 
degree, major EPPs have programmatic platform. Nevertheless, since all 
EPPs have been using ethnicity as the main means of political support, and 
non-of them emerged out of pre-existing civil society organizations, 
Ethiopia’s party system is not yet programmatic. In terms of the number of 
parties operating, Ethiopia’s party system is best characterized by dominant 
party system but also with certain features of one-party system. The study 
argues that Ethiopia should give special attention to depoliticizing ethnicity 
sooner than later, including by reopening its constitution for discussion and 
revisiting its electoral and political parties’ laws. 
 
Keywords: Civic programmatic party, Ethiopian political parties, Ethiopian 
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Introduction  
Following the introduction of multi-party system, after the end of 
WW-II, in the Western world, political parties (PPs) have been one of the 
major areas of preoccupation for political scientists and other scholars 
(Elischer,2010).  Since PPs in the West were established, mainly, around 
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clear ideology and political programs, the focus of researchers has been on 
how to classify PPs on the Right-Left spectrum. Following the end of the 
Cold War, many developing countries also introduced multi-party system. 
However, in many of the developing countries, which are pluralistic and 
agrarian; PPs have been established around divisive lines (ethnicity, religion, 
race, etc) as opposed to programmatic ideas. Consequently, researchers’ 
inquiry has been focused on whether the PPs in the developing world and the 
party system (PS) they are operating are programmatic (see IDEA, 2012).  
As one of the developing countries, Ethiopia introduced multi-party 
system following the 1991 regime change. Subsequently, dozens of political 
parties have been established. However, little has been done with regard to 
the degree of programmaticity of Ethiopian political parties (EPPs) and the 
nature and the type of the party system they are operating. Hence, this 
research was intended to analyse the level of prorammaticity and the 
typology of EPPs and  the nature and type of the PS they are operating, by 
taking four parties as a case study. In other words, the study was designed to 
answer whether EPPs and the PS they are operating are programmatic. To 
this end, four EPPs were purposefully selected. Three factors were taken in 
to consideration while selecting the PPs: the relative organizational capacity, 
the nature of the parties (coalition and non-coalition) and the availability of 
written political program. Websites, literature, the current Ethiopian 
Constitution and the Political Parties’ Law, the basic94 political program of 
the PPs under study, and to some extent the personal observation of the 
researcher were used as sources of data.  Both descriptive and analytical 
methods were employed and data were analyzed through qualitative 
approach. In analysing the degree of programmability and typology of EPPs, 
the model developed by the IDEA (2012) was used.  
The paper has three sections. The first one deals with conceptual 
frameworks (definition, function and typology of political parties’ as well as 
types of party systems). The second section addresses the typology of EPPs, 
their level of programmaticity and the type of the PS they are operating. The 
last one deals with concluding remark. 
 
Conceptual framework 
Definition of Political Party 
There is no single definition regarding what constitutes the term 
political party (PP). In general, however, a PP has been defined, mainly, 
based on its functions, characteristics and purposes. According to the ACE 
                                                          
94 A basic political program is different from other party documents such as election 
manifestos, which are regularly updated and re/designed for specific elections (see 
Hofmeister and Grabow, 2011).  
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encyclopedia (2013:8), a PP is defined as “an organized group of people who 
exercise their legal rights to identify with similar political aims and opinions, 
and one that seeks to influence public policy by getting its candidates elected 
to public office.” Similarly, Heywood (2002:248), defined PP as “---a group 
of people that is organized for the purpose of winning government power, by 
electoral or other means.” Unlike Heywood, Downs (1957:25) associates PP 
to group of people who controls or wishes to control power only through 
election. He wrote that “[a] political party is a team of men seeking to 
control the governing apparatus by ginning office in a duly constituted 
election.” Others defined PP as “any political group identified by an official 
label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through election, 
candidates for public office” (Sartori, 1976). Finally, Hofmeister and 
Grabow, (2011:12) defined political parties in a more comprehensive and in 
a manner that distinguishes them from other associations or groups. 
According to them, political parties can be understood as “permanent 
associations of citizens that are based on free membership and program, and 
which are anxious to occupy through the path of elections, the politically 
decisive positions of the country with their team of leaders, in order to 
materialize suggestions for resolving outstanding problems.” In all the 
definition given above, one can see two common defining elements of what 
constitutes political parties: participation in election and the demand to 
control public office.    
 
Function of Political Parties 
PP plays several functions in a society. To mention but a few, it 
provide alternative policy platforms, ideological directions and re-defining 
government agendas. PP serves as a “vital link between the state and the civil 
society, between the institution of government and the groups and interests 
that operate within the society” (Heywood, 2002:247). In general, PPs have 
the following major functions: representation; elite formation and 
recruitment; goal formation; interest articulation and aggregation; 
channelling of public opinion from citizens to government; socialization and 
mobilization of citizens; legitimization of political system and formation of 
government (see Heywood, 2002; Hofmeister and Grabow, 2011 and 
Huntington, 1968). To sum up, political parties are vital political institutions 
for the functioning of a modern democracy or organization of the modern 
democratic polity as well as political pluralism. Historically, they also played 
a key role in fighting and defeating colonialism and undemocratic or 
unpopular governments.   
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Typology of Political Parties  
Scholars have been classifying political parties (PPs) based on certain 
parameters. For example, political parties have been classified according to 
their level of organization, their socio-political targets, the social class they 
want to represent, their main role, and their stance towards the existing 
political system, etc. Taking such parameters in to account, political parties 
have been classified as cadre or mass parties, parties of integration or 
representation, popular parties or parties of special interest and as left or 
right wing parties.  Opposition parties have also been classified as parties 
opposing or conforming to the existing system (see Heywood, 2002 and 
Hofmeister and Grabow, 2011). It is worth noting, however, that these 
classifications are by no means exclusive. For example, ‘cadre’ or ‘mass’ 
PPs can at the same time be ‘constitutional’ or ‘parties opposed’ to the PS. 
Finally, a recent study undertaken by the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2012) on the PPs of 
developing countries came up with another classification. According to this 
study, PPs can be classified as ‘programmatic’ or ‘non-programmatic’ and as 
‘civic-programmatic’ or ‘ethnic- programmatic’.  
 
Classification of Parties by their Degree of  Programmaticity 
According to the IDEA (2012) PPs can be classified into two major 
blocks: ‘programmatic’ and ‘non-programmatic’. An ideal type 
programmatic PP is one in which well structured and stable ideological 
commitments constitute the basis for: (a) the link between the party and its 
constituents, (b) the internal organization of the party, and (c) the policy 
making process and the platform that results (Luna 2012:4 cited in ibid). On 
the other hand, a non-programmatic PP is one that has no programmatic 
linkage with its constituents, and that lacks programmatic organization and 
programmatic policy platform. There are other types of parties between the 
ideal type of programmatic parties and the non-programmatic parties as 
depicted in the table below.  
Table-1: Types of political parties based on the degree of programmaticity 
Programmatic linkage Programmatic  
organization 
Programmati
c policy 
Programmatic party type 
      Ideal type programmatic party 
  X   Weak programmatic party 
X     Elite programmatic party 
X X   Cadre programmatic party 
X   x Unstable programmatic party 
X X x Un-programmatic party 
Source: IDEA (2011:4) 
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‘Programmatic linkage’ refers to a situation where PPs mobilize 
support along programmatic lines and not through patron-client linkages. 
‘Programmatic organization’ refers to a situation  where decisions within the 
party are carried out based on democratic principles and its policy platform 
are developed with the participation of its members and the group of people 
it believes to represent. In such party, the fate of the PP is not dependent on 
its individual leader’s personality.  Finally ‘programmatic policy’ refers to a 
political program that is not explicitly designed to advance the interest of just 
one group of a society (IDEA, 2012).    
The IDEA (2012) also revealed that programmatic PPs can have 
either ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ organizational base. ‘Civic-programmatic parties’ 
are those in which their political programs do not disproportionately favour 
certain specific groups (ethnic, religious or regional) and do not receive 
disproportionate support from certain specific groups (although not 
impossible). In contrast, ‘ethnic-programmatic parties’ are those whose 
political programs include measures that although framed in a national way, 
will inevitably benefit certain specific groups and in return they receive 
disproportionate support from the same group. 
Table-2: Distinction between ethnic and civic-programmatic parties 
Programmatic 
party type 
Has a 
programmatic 
organization and 
linkages 
Receive 
disproportionate 
support from 
certain ethnic  
group 
Policy program 
benefits certain 
ethnic groups 
disproportionately 
Employ discourses  
that privilege 
certain ethnic group 
Ethnic Yes Yes Yes Possibly, but not  
exclusively 
Civic Yes Possibly, but 
usually not 
No No 
Source: IDEA (2012:6) 
 
Political Party System 
The entire group of PPs in a country form the political party system 
shortly called the Party System (PS). Thus, PS refers to the network of 
relationships or interactions between and among PPs within and/or outside of 
Parliament. The composition of PS is mainly the result of the structure of 
social conflicts and interests (see Heywood, 2002, Hofmeister and Grabow, 
2011 and Matlosa and Shale, 2008). On the other hand, PS is highly affected 
by electoral systems. For instance, electoral systems of a given country may 
encourage party formation by favouring candidates nominated by PPs or 
discourage party formation by recognizing only individual candidates. 
Mover, electoral systems may: encourage or retard the forging of alliance 
between political parties, provide incentives for PPs to be broadly based and 
accommodating or to base themselves on narrow appeals to ethnicity, 
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religion, kinship ties or any other specific groups which in return determines 
the broader political climate (see, ACE encyclopaedia, 2013). Generally, the 
type of PS which develops in a given state is largely influenced by the 
number and the degree of programmaticity of the PPs operating.   
 
Classification of Political System Based on the Number of Political 
Parties Operating  
PS are differentiated based on the number of PPs operating in a given 
state or the number of parties that form it (IDEA, 2007). Within this 
perspective, Heywood (2002) identified the following four types of party 
systems and their distinctive characteristics.   
 
One-Party System 
In one-PS, only ‘single party’ dominates and there is practically no 
real political competition between parties. In one PS, a single party enjoys a 
monopoly of power through the exclusion of all other parties by political (de 
facto) or constitution (de jure) means.  In situations of de facto one-PS, the 
ruling party dominates the political landscape and exercise hegemony over 
all the organs of the state without necessarily legally banning other PPs.  In 
situations of de jure one-PS, however, the ruling party have similar power as 
that of the de facto one but it also bans all other parties by constitutional 
means. One-PS, in general, is characterized by the following. Firstly, the 
party effectively functions as permanent government, with no peaceful 
mechanism of removing it from power, short of a coup or revolution. 
Secondly, the party effectively develops an entrenched relationship with the 
state machine where “party-state” relationship became fused. Thirdly, the 
party is usually built around the dominant role of a charismatic leader and 
draws whatever ideological identity it has possessed from the view of the 
leader. Fourthly, checks and balances among the key organs of the state and 
accountability are compromised. Finally, the ruling party faces no or limited 
parliamentary opposition.  
 
Two-Party System (Duopoly) 
As the name it indicates, in such PS, two PPs dominate the PS as 
‘major’ parties and both have more or less equal prospects of winning state 
power. The UK and the US are classical examples of such PS wherein two 
parties dominate the PS with alternate positions as ruling and opposition 
from time to time. Conventionally, a duopolistic PS can be identified by the 
following three criteria: 
a) Although a number of ‘minor’ parties may exist, only two parties 
dominate the PS with prospect of winning government power; 
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b) The larger party is able to rule alone; the other provides the 
opposition; and 
c) Power alternates between the two dominant parties  
 
Dominant –Party system 
Unlike one-PS, a dominant PS is competitive in the sense that a 
number of parties compete for power in regular and popular elections. 
However, such PS is dominated by one ‘major’ party that enjoys prolonged 
periods in power under the conditions of fragmented, disjointed and enfeeble 
oppositions. In this PS, the dominant party enjoys a prolonged state power, 
monopoly of policy making and faces a weak opposition with slim prospects 
for capturing state power in the foreseeable future (Matlosa and Shale, 2008; 
Heywood, 2002 and IDEA, 2007). In 2007, the IDEA classified 16 African 
countries under dominant-PS, which includes Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, etc.    
 
Multiparty-system  
Unlike other PS, a multiparty system is marked by competition 
among more than two political parties. In such system, many parties exist 
with equitable prospect to become governing parties, either individually or in 
the form of coalition. In multiparty system, the probability of emerging one-
party or dominant PS is bleak. This system is particularly known for party 
coalition within and outside government and coalition governments. 
Traditionally, a multiparty system emerges in countries that follow 
proportional representation and mixed election systems.  Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, Algeria, Burkinafaso, Nigeria and Mauritius are cited as examples 
of countries under multiparty-system (Matlosa and Shale, 2008 and IDEA, 
2007). 
In conclusion, a PS is said to be institutionalized, if it displays stable 
inter-party competition and features parties with roots in society. Otherwise, 
the mere presence of parties does not guarantee the existence of PS 
(Heywood, 2002). Depending on the political culture, the political ideology 
of PPs and political history of a given state, party systems can be marked 
either by one of cooperation and consensus, which usually leads to political 
stability  or by one of conflict, fragmentation and polarization that more 
often than not leads to political instability. 
 
Classification of Political Systems Based on the Degree of 
Programmaticity 
Based on the degree of progrmmaticity of the PPs operating, PS is 
classified as ‘programmatic’ or ‘clientelistic’ (IDEA, 2012). A  PS is said to 
be programmatic when PPs predominantly generate policy, mobilize 
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support, and govern on the basis of consistent and coherent ideological 
positions. In other words, PS is said to be programmatic if most or all PPs of 
a given country have well structured and stable ideological commitments 
that constitute the basis for: a) the link between the party and its 
constituents, b) the electoral competition between parties, and c) the policy 
making process (Luna, 2012 cited in IDEA, 2012). However, when most or 
all parties seek to mobilize support through ethnic and patron-client 
networks, the PS is known as clientilistic. The critical question that 
distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic linkage is how recipients 
become eligible to access publicly provided benefits. In the former case, 
activist networks screen deserving from undeserving voters and mediate 
access to excludable  goods ( such us handouts, public sector job or public 
works). In the latter case, the group of beneficiaries is defined by policy and 
access is independent from partisan distribution networks (Calvo and 
Murillo, 2013).  
According to the IDEA (2012), the development of institutionalized 
programmatic or clientelistic PS depends on two major factors: (a) the 
composition of the initial support base of the party (b) the extent to which the 
party emerges out of pre-existing civil society organizations (relations of the 
party with civil society actors). Considering the interaction of these two 
factors, the IDEA developed the following four main variant programmatic 
parties that shape the institutionalization of programmaticity of PS in a given 
state: 
A) Institutionalized civic programmatic parties: are types of 
programmatic parties that do not have links to specific ethnic 
communities but do form strong ties to civil society groups. Since 
such parties face few internal barriers in pursuing programmatic 
agendas, they are most likely to maintain programmatic approach in 
mobilizing support. 
B)  Institutionalized ethnic programmatic parties: such parties integrate 
the support of specific ethnic group but also emerge with strong ties 
to civil society.  Such parties are likely to maintain programmatic 
approach, but their diverse seat of linkages may impede them to 
maintain policy cohesion.  
C) Non-institutionalized civic programmatic parties: such parties do not 
integrate the support of particular ethnic group but also fail to form 
strong ties to civil society groups.  Such parties face few incentives to 
abandon a policy based approach, but are also less likely to come 
under pressure to deepen their programmatic commitments.  
D) Non-institutionalized ethnic programmatic parties: such parties do 
build strong linkages to an ethnic group but they also develop a 
limited relationship with civil society organizations. Due to their 
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limited linkage to civil societies and being trapped by demands from 
particular groups, such parties are less likely to consolidate a 
programmatic organization and policy based approach.  
 
Political Parties, Party Programmaticity and Party System in Ethiopia 
The genesis of political party in Ethiopia 
Since the Second World War, PPs emerged as vital players in State 
politics, particularly in the Western world. Later on, many of the 
‘decolonized’ States in Latin America, Asia and Africa followed suit in 
introducing multi-party system. However, Ethiopia, which was not colonized 
but was under the rule of absolute feudal monarchies, since its modern 
statehood, had no the culture of party politics until the Workers’ Party of 
Ethiopia (WPE), the only party in town at that time, was legally established 
in 1989, by the socialist military regime of the Derg.  
Nevertheless, organized opposition political groups emerged during 
the regime of Emperor Hailesselasie-I (1931-1974). Since any form of 
opposition to the monarch was illegal, however, these political forces had 
either to wag armed struggle or carry out their struggle in the form of 
clandestine activities or both (Wondwosen, 2008; 2009, Merera, 2006 and 
Alem, 2003). Similarly, banning, criminalizing and persecuting of all types 
of opposition political forces continued during the Derue regime (1974-
1991). Thus, it was only after the removal of the Derg regime that Ethiopia 
legally introduced multiparty politics.  
 
Typology of Ethiopian Political Parties 
Considering their historical evolution, their ultimate goals and the 
means they use to realize their goals,EOPPs) have been classified in to 
several categories (see for example, Wondwosen, 2009). For the sack of this 
paper, however, the following four parameters are used to classify EPPs. 
 
EPPs on the Constitutional and un-Constitutional divide 
Currently, EPPs can be broadly grouped into two blocks: those who 
seek regime change through extra-constitutional means and those 
who want regime change within the constitutional order. Political 
groups that belong to the extra-constitutional block are those which 
have been using armed struggle and clandestine activities to remove 
the incumbent government. Most of these political organizations have 
armed and civilian wings and have been mainly operating from 
outside of the country. Historically, while some of these political 
groups were established before 1991 regime change, others were 
established after 1991.  They have been legally banned from 
operating their political activities within Ethiopia. Examples of such 
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political forces include: the EPRP (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Party; the EPPF (Ethiopian people’s Patriotic Front); G-7 (Ginbet-
7).); the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) and the ONLF (Ogden 
National Liberation Front). Unlike the others, the last two political 
forces have been aiming at not only regime change but also breaking 
away of their respective ethnic groups. 
The second block can be grouped as ‘legal’ opposition PPs which 
seek regime change through constitutional means or to get a seat in the 
national, regional and local level legislative bodies. All political groups of 
this category are established after 1991. They have been legally registered by 
the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), to peacefully contest in 
election and to control political power at regional or national level or both. 
PPs under this category are registered as ‘country-wide’ or ‘regional’ 
political parties 95  based on “The Revised Political Parties Registration 
Proclamation” (Proc. No.573/2008) of Ethiopia. Finally, Ethiopia’s legal 
opposition parties can be broadly subdivided into what I call the “deny and 
oppose” and “recognize and oppose” blocks.  
The “deny and oppose” type oppositions are those whose leaders are 
dominantly dawn from servants of former regimes (who served as ministers, 
members of parliament, military generals or below). Parties under this block 
have been reluctant to collaborate with and to recognize any achievements 
made by the ruling party. Thus, they have been using the “deny and oppose 
strategy”.  The ruling party on its part have been allegedly accusing them of 
being sympathizers of former political order, or being chauvinist or 
parochialist and for using or tempting to use unconstitutional means to 
change government, including by establishing ties with outlawed political 
forces and using popular strikes. PPs under this block and the ruling party 
have been treating each other as enemies rather than as alternative political 
forces (ICG, 2009).   Examples of PPs under this category include: the 
former CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy), the former UEDF 
(United Ethiopian Democratic Forces) the AAPO (All Amara People’s 
Organization, which is now renamed as All Ethiopian Unity Part (AEUP), 
the UDJ (Unity for Democracy and Justice); the EFDUF (Ethiopia Federal 
Democratic Unity Forum) and the OFDM (Oromo Federalist Democratic 
Movement).  
The second block that falls under the category of legal opposition PPs 
involves those which have been willing to collaborate with and to recognize 
certain achievements made by the ruling party. In some cases, PPs of this 
                                                          
95 For the list of country-wide and regional political parties see NEBE (2012), online:  
http://www.electionethiopia.org/en/political-parties/active-political-parties.html (accessed 
on 20/11/2013)  
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block have been supporting government’s newly introduced laws (for 
example, the Anti-Terrorism Law), decisions (for example, the classification 
of OLF, ONLF, Al-shabbab and Gunbet-7 as terrorist groups) and actions 
(for example, the 2006 intervention against radical Islamist in Somalia and 
the construction of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam). Although with 
reservations, they have also been acknowledging achievement they believe 
are attributed to the ruling party. In this regard, they have been using the 
“recognize and oppose” strategy. Example of PPs under this category 
include: the EDP (Ethiopian Democratic Party) after 2005 and several other 
PPs. Here, it is worth mentioning that in the Ethiopian political culture, 
oppositions are known for opposing everything that emanates from and 
magnifying faults committed by the incumbent government as well as 
denying any successes achieved by and not collaborating with the ruling 
party (see, Adal, 2010). Thus, the fact that the second block of the legal 
oppositions have been collaborating with the ruling party on certain aspects 
have been judged as “Phony oppositions” (see Wondwosen, 2009).        
For the sake of this paper, I will only focus on EPPs that are grouped 
as legal. According to the revised political parties’ registration proclamation 
(Proc. No.573/2008), EPPs have the right to be registered as ‘regional’ or 
‘country-wide’ political party. Currently there are 80 registered PPs in 
Ethiopia, of which about 70% (56) are regional while the remaining 30% 
(24) are country-wide. However, only few PPs have been relatively vibrant 
at national level. Thus, in an attempt of evaluating the degree of 
programmaticity of EPP and the PS they are operating, four PPs have been 
purposefully selected. Four of them have been relatively vibrant in terms of 
mobilizing supporters, recruiting members, and in getting media and public 
attention, notwithstanding the difference that exist among them in terms of 
organizational capacity, leadership experience and lifespan. All of them have 
written political programs and they all are registered as ‘country-
wide’/national political parties. Below are the PPs and the reasons why they 
have been selected.  
A) Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF): 
EPRDF is a coalition of four ethnic/region based PPs. These are: TPLF 
(Tigray People’s Liberation Front); EPDM (Ethiopian People’s Democratic 
Movement later renamed as APDM (Amara People’s Democratic 
Movement); OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic Organization); and the 
SEPDM (Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Movement, which itself is 
a coalition of more than a dozen ethnic based political parties). TPLF, 
APDM, OPDO and SEPDM have their basis in Tigray, Amara, Oromaya and 
the South Nation, Nationalities and Peoples Regional States respectively. 
The EPRDF was established in 1989 (on how the EPRDF was formed and 
evolved, see Wondewosen, 2009 and Solomon, 2009).  
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At least two major reasons were taken in selecting EPRDF as a case 
study. The first major reason is that the EPRDF has been in power since the 
politics of multiparty was introduced in 1991 in Ethiopia, both at federal 
level and in the respective Regional governments of its constitute parties. 
Secondly, although EPRDF has its base in the four Regional states, it has its 
“satellite political parties”96 in the remaining five Regional states of Ethiopia 
(Afar, Somali, Gambela, Benishangul-Gumuz and Hareri). These satellite 
parties have been ruling their respective Regions by adopting the ideological 
orientation and the political programmes of the EPRDF. Thus, by taking 
EPRDF as a proxy, it is assumed that we are studying some other five 
political parties. 
B) EFDUF (Ethiopia Federal Democratic Unity Forum (in short 
called Forum or Medrek in Amharic). It was established mainly from 
splinters of the former UEDF (Hibret in Amharic) and CUD97 (Knjit in 
Amharic). Medrek is a coalition of seven opposition political parties 98, 
established in 2009. Three reasons were taken in selecting this party. First, 
EFDUF is one of the largest coalitions and has been relatively a vibrant 
opposition. Secondly, many of Medek’s member parties have been 
participating in the last three or at least last two consecutive elections before 
they joined the coalition and Medrek itself participated in the 2010 national 
election. Thirdly, before 2009, two of the member parties of Medrek were 
members of a relatively strong coalition called UEDF. The UEDF (which 
was a coalition of 14 PPs) won about 10% (52 seats) in the national 
parliamentary seat in the 2005 election (NEBE, 2005). Thu, similar to the 
EPRDF, by studying EFDUF it is assumed that it will help to examine the 
nature of other EPPs that EFDUF has in common.  
C) Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP): is a non-coalition party.  It 
was established in 1999. Four factors were taken in selecting this party as 
case study. First, this party stayed relatively for a long period of time (14 
                                                          
96  They have been called satellite political parties because they have no their own 
independent political program. The only thing what makes them different from the 
constituting members of the EPRDF is that they have not been legally registered as members 
of the EPRDF. They are: ANDP (Afar National Democratic Party, in Afar Region), BGPDP 
(Benishangul Gumuz People's Democratic Party, in Benishangul-Gumuz Region) 
HNL(Harari National League, in Harari Region), GPUDM(Gambela People's Unity 
Democratic Movement, in Gambela Region) and SPDP (Somali People's Democratic Party, 
in Somali Region) 
97 The UDJ (Unity for Democracy and Justice) was established by some former CUD leaders 
and members, and was a founding member of the EFDUF. However, since 2012 it has been 
operating independently.     
98  For the list of members of the EFDUF, see NEBE, (2012), 
http://www.electionethiopia.org/en/political-parties/active-political-parties.html (accessed 
on 20/11/2013).  
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years) in the opposition camp and has been participating in elections. 
Secondly, this party claims as ‘civic’ political party. Thirdly, with the 
objective of winning election, it has desperately been merging with many 
other political parties, including with the Ethiopia Democratic Union (EDU) 
a political party that was established by reactionary ex-members of the 
feudal monarchy of Emperor Hilesselasie-I and with the Ethiopian Medhin 
Democratic Party (EMDP), a party founded by ex-foreign minister of the 
Derg regime, in 1993. Fourthly and most importantly, EDP was a member of 
the CUD, which posed a formidable challenge to the ruling party in the 2005 
election. CUD was a coalition of four parties which wan 20% of the national 
parliamentary seat in the 2005. Thus, the fact that EDP has been merging 
with many other Ethiopian political parties indicates that EDP had something 
in common with them. Moreover, EDP did not split due to differences in 
ideology or political programs from CUD and hence it can serve as a proxy 
in studying former member parties of the coalition which have been 
operating individually after the coalition was dissolved in 2008.    
D) Blue (Semayawi in Amharic) party: this is a non-coalition party 
established early 2011. Two things were important in considering this party. 
First, the fact that it was established recently can help us to see if there is any 
change on the ideological orientation and programmatic ideas of EPPs. 
Secondly, since its establishment, it has been relatively active in organizing 
demonstrations and it has been receiving media and public attention both 
domestically and by the Ethiopian Diaspora.  
 
Classifying Ethiopian Political Parties by the degree of programmaticity 
Either because of their ethnic nature or other reasons, Ethiopian 
opposition political parties (EOPPs) have been severely criticized for lack of 
developing credible alternative political programs and clear ideological 
orientation (Fissha, 2013; Kasahun, 2009; ICG, 2009 and Alemayehu, 2012). 
It is a public knowledge that for majority of EOPPs, let alone their political 
programs even their name is not well known to the wider Ethiopian public. 
In principle, all EPPs, including the parties under study, are expected to have 
their own written political programs. As per Pro.No.573/2008 (art. 8 (2), to 
be registered by the NEBE, a political party must submit a political program 
among other things.  
There was a televised debate between the major opposition parties 
and the ruling party, at least, in the last three consecutive elections (2000, 
2005 and 2010). During these elections, the ruling party and the major 
oppositions announced their policy platforms using the air time allocated to 
them in the public Radio and Television. However, it is difficult to conclude 
that EPPs have been outreaching the predominantly rural (80% or more) 
community of Ethiopia by simply broadcasting their political program 
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through Radio and Television. Moreover, neither the opposition nor the 
ruling party were free from sectional appeals (ICG, 2009) and thus, it is hard 
to say that EPPs relay primarily on programmatic ideas in terms of their 
linkage to the electoral constituencies. Most importantly, EOPPs are 
characterized by lack of internal democracy, credible and stable political 
programs, strong links with Civil Society Organization (CSOs) and 
personalization of party leadership (Alefe, 2013 and Kassahun, 2009), which 
all together negatively affects the degree of their programmaticity. 
According to Harego, (nd:2), instead of focussing on the development of 
credible policy alternatives, EOPPs have been engaged “towards destructive 
campaigns and hatred politics and the main focus have been restricted to 
fault finding, exaggerating trivial matters and in many occasions in 
fabrication and distortion of truth for their own narrow advantages.”   
Taking the three factors developed by the IDEA (2012) to 
differentiate the degree of programmaticity of PPs, the EPPs understudy can 
be classified as follows, notwithstanding the fact that none of the oppositions 
understudy was practically tested on how they would have implemented their 
policy had they been given the chance to run public office.    
Table-3: EPPs According to Their Level of Programmaticity 
Party  
name 
Programmatic  
linkage 
Programmatic 
organization 
Programmatic 
policy 
Party type 
EPRDF   partially99   Programmatic 
EFDUF x x   Cadre 
programmatic 
EDP x partially100   Elite 
programmatic 
Blue x x   Cadre 
programmatic 
 
 The EPRDF has a relatively strong programmatic linkage with its 
constituents, particularly with the rural peasantry and the urban poor. Its core 
political program, ADLI (Agricultural Development that leads to 
Industrialization), has been targeting the rural society. Overtime, however, it 
has been introducing several pro-poor policies and programs to the urban 
sector, that include motivating and supporting small and medium scale 
enterprises established by the urban poor and urban housing (see EPRDF 
Congress report, 2013). Its political programs are not designed to advance 
                                                          
99 Although EPRDF has a strong organizational cohesion and a party that highly relays 
around its program rather on its leaders (EPRDF proven its survival after the dismissal of its 
several leaders and even after the death of its long serving leader Meles Zenawi), but it has 
been exercising democratic centralism, in which policy decisions and election of the 
EPRDF’s chairman are simple carried out by its senior members (the ‘Central Committee’ )  
100 EDP has relatively strong organizational cohesion and internal democracy (that includes 
change of top leadership) 
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the interest of particular group (s) (see EPRDF’s basic political program, 
2006). In addition to its basic political programs, EPRDF produced dozens of 
sector specific and cross-cutting programs.  
What all the opposition under study have in common in terms of 
programmaticity is that they lack strong programmatic linkage with the 
wider electoral constituency of Ethiopia: the rural community. Their 
movement has been very much limited to the urban community. Moreover, 
even with the urban community, their linkage is not programmatic as such 
because they do not have similar support across the urban community of 
Ethiopia. For example, the Blue party and EDP do not receive the same 
support in other cities of Ethiopia as they receive in Addis Ababa and some 
other cities in the Amara Regional state. Furthermore, although all the 
oppositions under study have political programs they are mainly elite driven 
in sense that they are prepared by few elite who control their respective 
parties. As mentioned above, they also lack internal democracy and 
dependency around political programs; the parties are rather highly 
dependent around the personality of their leaders. Finally, except EDP which 
places itself as centre right, EFDUP and Blue party lack clear ideological 
orientation.    
 
Classifying Ethiopian Political Parties on the Ethnic-Civic divide  
Generally, one thing is crystal clear with regard to EPPs: 
quantitatively, an absolute majority of EPPs are ethnic based political 
parties101. Ethnic based party is defined as one which ‘drives its support 
overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or a cluster of groups) 
and serves the interest of that group’ (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). Despite 
the fact that the revised Party Registration Proclamation (Proc.No.573/2008) 
recognizes only political parties established at nation or regional level, about 
70% of the registered EPPs have ethnic names, indicating that they are 
parties affiliated to specific ethno-linguistic group residing in one of the 
Regional states of Ethiopia102. Moreover, many of the EPPs registered as 
country wide are not free from integrating ethnicity in to their political 
organization because they have been using ethnicity as a means of 
mobilizing support and there were cases were national PPs received 
disproportionate support from specific ethnic group. For example, in the 
2005 election, the CUD and the EPRDF received disproportionate support in 
                                                          
101  For the list of ethnic based EPPs, see NEBE (2012), 
http://www.electionethiopia.org/en/political-parties/active-political-parties.html (accessed 
on 20/11/2013). 
102 The current federating units (Regional states) of Ethiopia have at least more than one 
linguistic group. Thus under this context, a party that carries the name of a specific linguistic 
group cannot be a regional party.  
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the Amara and Tigray Regional states, which are  dominated by Amharic and 
Tigrigna speaking people respectively (see Wondweson, 2009; 
Ishiyama,2009). Furthermore, EPPs have not been free from employing the 
ethnic card in mobilizing supporters and recruiting members.  
To sum up, so far, whether EPPs are registered as national or regional 
parties, it is hard to find an ideal type civic party free of the ethnic nerve. 
This is particularly true as EPPs are mainly identified by their top leaders 
(Fisseha, 2013), rather than by their political program, which makes them to 
be easily associated with the ethnic background of the top leader(s).There are 
three major possible arguments as to why EPPs emerged predominantly as 
ethnic parties. The first one is associated with the history of the country. The 
second one has to do with the existing legal environment. The third one is 
associated with the policies and practices of the ruling party, EPRDF, 
towards diversity.  
As mentioned above, EPRDF is a coalition of four ethnic based 
parties. However, its political programs are not in any way designed to 
favour its constituencies. Rather, EPRDF’s government has been consistently 
and strongly working to narrow the gap between its constituencies and the 
constituent of its satellite parties (see supra) using budgetary and other 
affirmative action. Medrek like EPRDF is coalition of, mainly, ethnic based 
parties. As their name indicates, the two other parties, EDP and Blue party, 
are individual parties. So far, it is fair to say that EDP’s main constituency is 
in the Amara Regional state and Addis Ababa. Similarly, Blue party’s 
movement has been limited to Addis Ababa. According to ICG (2009), 
Addis Ababa itself is dominated by ethnic Amara descendants and this in 
turn may indicate that both parties have special affiliation with ethnic Amara.  
In general, EPRDF and EFDUF are best classified as semi-ethnic 
programmatic because ethnicity is at the centre of their organizational base. 
EDP and Blue part can qualify semi-civic programmatic because although 
they are established as civic PPs, as mentioned above, they still have special 
association with the Amara ethnic group.  
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Table-4: EPPs According to the Ethnic-Civic Divide 
Party 
name 
Have 
programmatic 
organization 
and  linkages 
Receive 
disproportionate 
support from 
certain ethnic  
group 
Policy program 
benefits certain ethnic 
groups 
disproportionately 
Employ 
discourses  that 
privilege certain 
ethnic group 
Programmatic 
party type 
EPRDF Yes Partially103 No No Semi-ethnic 
programmatic 
EFDUF No Partially No No Semi-ethnic 
programmatic 
EDP Partially Partially No No Semi-civic 
programmatic 
Blue No Not known104 No No Semi-civic 
programmatic 
 
Classification of EOPPs by their stand to the current political system  
Opposition political parties (OPPs) are classified as conforming or 
opposing based on their stance to the existing constitutional order. If OPPs 
accept the constitutional order in which they are active and wishes to 
stabilize or improve it gradually with reforms, acknowledge the rights and 
entitlements of other parties, acknowledge and respect the existing rules of 
electoral competition, they are called constitutional or parties conforming to 
the system. On the other hand, if OPPs have a policy platform that reject the 
basic principles of the existing political order and pursue for changing of the 
existing constitutional structure, mostly with aggressive programmatic 
proposals that include tactics ranging from outright insurrection and popular 
revolution to the quasi-legalism, they are classified as revolutionary or 
parties opposed to the system (Heywood, 2002); Hofmeister and Grabow, 
2011).     
Looking at the political programs of the EOPPs understudy, one can 
simply conclude that they are fundamentally ‘parties opposed to the system’. 
They all have in common that they want to eradicate some of the peculiar 
characteristics of the current constitutional structure.  Moreover, the major 
oppositions have been trying their best to remove the ruling party through 
every means possible including by popular strikes. The ruling party has been 
accusing some opposition parties of tacitly collaborating with armed 
opposition or being sympathizer of former regimes (Wondwosen, 2009; ICG, 
2009).The table below shows what the oppositions understudy have in 
common in opposing the status quo. In the table below the stand of the 
                                                          
103 EPRDF, party members of the EFDUF and EDP were getting some disproportionate 
support from certain ethnic groups. For example, in the 2005 election, EPRDF got a 
disproportionate support in Tigray and Ormoya Regional states; while EDP (which was a 
member of CUD) got a disproportionate support in the Amara Region and some party 
members of the EFDUF in Oromya Region state and SNNPRS.  
104 Since Blue party have never participated in elections so far, it is not known whether it 
will get a disproportionate support from any specific ethnic group.  
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EOPPs under study towards certain constitutional issues are put as yes (if 
they are in favour of the issue), no (if they are against the issue) and dash (if 
they are neutral about the issue).   
Table-5: EOPPs according g to their stance to the current Constitutional order 
Constitutional issues Party name 
 EFDUF EDP Blue 
Vesting sovereignty on the nation, nationality and people of Ethiopia (Art.8) No No No 
No national Language and all languages are equally recognized 105 (Art.5) - No No 
The right of nations  to self determination including  secession (Art.39 (1) No No No 
State and public ownership of land and no land users have the right to sale or 
change it (Art.40(3) 
Yes No No 
Parliamentary form of government (Art.45) Yes Yes No 
Language106 based federal arrangement (Art. 47) - No No 
Minority representation at the lower house (House of Peoples Representatives 
(HPR) (Art. 54(3) 
Yes - - 
Vesting  the power of interpreting the constitution  on the upper house (House 
of Federation 107 (HoF) (Art. 83) 
No No No 
First past the post electoral system/simple majority vote - No - 
Prime Minister with unlimited terms (Art.73) No No No 
HoF  shall represent each ethnic group as per its size; is elected by State 
Council and shall have  no legislative power as such (HoF) (Art. 61&62) 
No No No 
National Electoral  Board  leaders shall appointed by the PM (Art.102(2) - No No 
Source: organized by the author based on the FDRE constitution (1995), and the political 
programs of the parties understudy (Medrek, 2009; Blue party, 2011 and EDP, 2009). 
 
Each party has developed its own alternative proposal to the various 
constitutional principles it is opposing. Here, however, the effort is to show 
to what extent the EOPPs under study oppose the existing constitutional 
order. All the parties under study have in common that they want the upper 
house (HoF) to have a role in law making and its current power of 
constitutional interpretation be given to a Constitutional court (to be 
established). EDP and Blue parties also proposed that the HoF should be 
composed of representatives from federating states unlike its present 
composition. Presently, the HoF is composed of representatives from each 
ethnic group of Ethiopia, mainly, as per their size. Finally, it is worth noting 
that an absolute majority of the Ethnic based EOPPs are not necessarily 
against the existing fundamental constitutional structures and principles. 
                                                          
105According to Art. 5 of the FDRE Constitution,  there is no National language but Amharic 
serves as working language of the federal government 
106 Although majority of the exiting federating units of Ethiopia are demarcated mainly on 
the basis of language, as per the constitution, settlement patterns, language, identity and 
consent of the people concerned are to be taken as basis of delimiting federating states.  
107 In principle this house is the upper house of Ethiopia’s bicameral legislative. However, 
its legislative power is limited to politically sensitive issue, including the power to interpret 
the constitution. 
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Their focus is rather on resource and power sharing or properly 
implementing the Constitution itself.    
 
Party System in Ethiopia  
In this section we shall discuss Ethiopia’s PS in terms of the number 
of parties operating and the degree of programmaticity/institutionalization of 
party system.  
 
Based on the number of parties operating  
Based on the number of PPs operating in the country as well as the 
relative strength of the oppositions and the ruling party, IDEA (2007) 
classified Ethiopia under the dominant-party system. More than a dozen 
EPPs participated in the last four consecutive elections organized since 1991. 
However, due to the presence of fragmented, disjointed and enfeeble 
oppositions (Fissha, 2013; Kassahun, 2009; ICG, 2009 and Alemayehu, 
2012), the ruling party has been enjoying a prolonged state power and a 
monopoly of policy making, which are all typical characteristics of dominant 
system (see Matlosa and Shale, 2008 and Heywood 2002).  
Since 2005, the ruling party introduced some moderate 
transformations that, under normal circumstance, will help it to continue as a 
dominant party. Firstly, before the 2005 Election, the EPRDF was a ‘cadre’ 
type political party, in which party members were secretly recruited based on 
strict political and ideological grounds. After, the 2005 election, however, 
EPRDF transformed itself in to ‘mass party’ in which membership has 
become open to everyone, notwithstanding that the commitment of the newly 
recruited members has been questioned. As of 2013, EPRDF had 6.16 
million members (see EPRDF-Congress Report, 2013). Secondly, since 
2009, EPRDF introduced EPRDF women and youth league, which are 
instrumental in mobilizing support. Currently, there are 1,600,000 EPRDF-
Women League and 1,250,445 EPRDF-Youth League members108. Thirdly, 
the ruling party has been providing trainings to top and middle level leaders 
on policy matters. For example, as of 2013, 28,823 mid-level and 2,118 high 
rank leaders were trained on matters of development and good governance 
(Ibid). Finally, EPRDF has been organizing discussions on policy issues and 
their performance with concerned bodies in the presence of the Prime 
Minister and other Ministers109 from different sectors. For example, since the 
2005 election, the Prime Minister’s Office and other Ministerial Offices  
have been organizing several meeting to discuss policy and performance 
                                                          
108 Online: http://www.eprdf.org.et (accessed on 25/05/2014).  
109 I consider the ministers’ activity as part of EPRDF’s activity because all Ministers are 
senior members of the EPRDF.  
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related issue, particularly with urban dwellers, traders, artists, university 
communities (particularly from Addis Ababa University), and 
representatives of different religious and other association.  
Evaluating Ethiopia’s PS from the number of PPs operating, it is 
worth noting that the ruling party has been effectively exercising some of the 
typical characteristics of “de facto one party system”. Firstly, the ruling party 
has been effectively functioning as permanent government for the last 23 
years and developed an entrenched relationship with the state machinery, in 
which ‘party-state’ relationship has been ‘fused’. Secondly, as it can be seen 
from its statue (EPRDF, 2006), the ruling party follows democratic 
centralism and vanguardism 110  as its organizational guiding principles. 
Thirdly, checks and balances among the key organs of the state and 
accountability have not been strong enough and the ruling party has not been 
facing limited parliamentary opposition. Finally, EPRDF had been identified 
with its long serving chairman Meles Zenawi (until his in 2012), and all 
ideological shifts (from socialism to market economy, to developmental state 
and finally to democratic developmental state today) were mainly emanating 
from his personal capacity. Due to his ideological passion and conviction and 
extraordinary intellectual, political and articulating capacity, as well as his 
active involvement in the various national strategic policies formulated 
during his time111, the late PM. Meles was prized as strong and visionary 
leader locally and internationally (see BBC report, August 21, 2012). All of 
the above, according to Heywood (2002), are particular feature of one-party 
system. 
 
Based on the degree of programmaticity  
Based on the degree of progrmmaticity of the PPs operating in the 
system, PS is classified as “programmatic” or “clientelistic” (IDEA, 2012). 
A PS is said to be programmatic when PPs predominantly generate policy, 
mobilize support, and govern on the basis of consistent and coherent 
ideological positions. However, when most or all parties seek to mobilize 
support through ethnic and patron-client networks and seek power to control 
over state resources, the PS is known as clientilistic. Generally, a PS cannot 
be programmatic if most PPs mobilize support on the basis of ethnic or 
clientelistic ties, because in this context elections will not be decided by 
debates over policy issues, but by which of the range of mobilization 
                                                          
110 EPRDF claims itself as the vanguard of the peasantry and the urban poor (see EPRDF’s 
political program, 2006).  
111 The late PM. Meles was behind all major policy crafts, including Ethiopia’s policy of 
food security, the ongoing development policy called ‘Growth and Transformation Plan’ 
(GTP) and Foreign policy of Ethiopia (an Interview with research and development Officer, 
in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 21/04/2010).    
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strategies on show proves to be the most effective (Luna, 2012 cited in 
IDEA, 2012).  
Against the above backdrop, it is hard to say that Ethiopia’s PS has 
been programmatic because, as mentioned elsewhere above, all EPPs, 
whether they carry civic or ethnic name, have been using the ethnic card as 
their primary tool of mobilization (ICG, 2009). The development of 
institutionalized programmatic or clientelistic PS depends on: the 
composition of the initial support base of the party and the extent to which 
the party emerges out of pre-existing civil society organizations. PPs that 
have strong ties with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are most likely to 
develop programmatic PS. In Ethiopia, however, non-of the PPs (including 
those understudies) did emerge out of pre-existing CSO. After all, the 
presence of independent CSOs in the history of Ethiopia is very weak. 
According to the IDEA (2011), the presence of large rural constituencies; 
weak and depoliticized civil society groups and low media penetration 
retards the development of programmatic PS. This holds true in Ethiopia.  
 
Conclusion  
Up-to-date, Ethiopia has armed opposition forces some of which 
were established decades ago. After 1991, Ethiopia introduced multi-party 
system. Since then, dozens of PPs have been legally established, of which an 
absolute majority are ethnic based. Although with a varying degree, all the 
PPs under study are found to be programmatic.  Nevertheless, since all the 
PPs understudy have been using ethnicity as the main means of political 
support, and since none of them was established out of existing CSOs, 
Ethiopia’s PS has not been programmatic. In terms of the number of parties 
operating, Ethiopia’s PS is best characterized by dominant PS but also with 
certain characteristics of one-party system.    
As the study shows, while majority of the ethnic based EPPs do not 
necessarily oppose the current constitutional order, the relatively vibrant 
EOPPs under study (and the armed forces) are opposing to the exiting 
political order. Consequently, Ethiopia’s PS has been characterised by 
acrimonious game; parties relate to each other as enemies and thus inter-
party relations tend to be marked by mutual suspicions and animosity 
between the oppositions and the ruling party as well as among the 
oppositions (Lidetu, 2009). This has been leading to more politicization of 
ethnicity, political fragmentation and polarization. It is therefore high time 
for Ethiopia to begin a protracted struggle against politicizing ethnicity and 
political polarization. In this regard, the following four points could be 
helpful.  
Firstly, since the major EOPP (both the armed and legal) are 
opposing the existing constitutional order, the supreme law of the land 
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should be reopened for discussion. In this regard, Ethiopia’s supporters such 
as the United States, China, European Union, African Union, and others 
should do their best to bring together all Ethiopian political forces (both the 
armed and legal oppositions and the ruling party) to discuss and determine 
their country’s fate. Secondly, Ethiopia’s Political party law should be 
redesigned in a way to promote the formation of cross-ethnic, cross-region 
and cross-rural-urban areas PPs. Thirdly, in multi-national/cultural countries 
like Ethiopia, the majority vote electoral system seems inappropriate since 
“winner”, EPRDF has been taking almost all parliamentary seats to the total 
dismay of all other rivals, it usually has been leading to post-election 
tensions. Thus, Ethiopia needs to change its electoral system to proportional 
representation so as to more inclusive. Finally, the so-called independent 
CSOs and the private media have been hostile to any sort of collaboration or 
smooth relationship between the ruling and opposition parties. This needs to 
be changed in that media and CSOs should promote collaboration among 
EPPs and should push them towards strong programmaticity.  
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